Malaya What If
- Thread starter Fatboy Coxy
- Start date
Fatboy Coxy
Monthly Donor
Hi justinmil22, can you expand on that for me please, are we talking about US Air Forces in China supplied via Rangoon and the Burma Road, or are you suggesting US ground troops as well?
Hmm @Fatboy Coxy a question would it be worth the British increasing the supply flow and improving the Burma Road were they can? I known that Chang and his cronies will sell a percentage but easing the flow of supplies will help.
Mark1878
Donor
Won't Britain leave that to the Americans.
Britain does not really care about China but the US seems to.
The British IMHO would help* with transport of US supplies but not send anything themselves.
* So providing space at docks, Indian labourers to unload ships and maybe railway transport where feasible. Onward journeys by trucks etc . not so much.
Driftless
Donor
Its definitely a sidebar conversation to the OP, but a larger US Army presence in China has significant implications. Just for a simple opener, if more supplies get through via the Burma Road, and US troops are guarding the supply dumps and even the delivery of those supplies, relations with Chiang are going to deteriorate(less graft). Vinegar Joe Stillwell had zero respect for Chiang, but little leverage OTL. Stillwell was one of the few senior US Generals who spoke Chinese(Mandarin?) and had knowledge of the country, but he might push Chiang too hard, and get himself sacked. If Stillwell remains, he now (should have) more leverage. If he gets the hook, who replaces him? It would need to be a three-star general with some tact and diplomatic stones, which might have to be MacArthur, or Bradley, or ????
For someone with more knowledge of China in the leadup to and during WW2, that's a TL unto itself
For someone with more knowledge of China in the leadup to and during WW2, that's a TL unto itself
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Ramp-Rat
Monthly Donor
In the event that the British retain Burma, once the Japanese decide to invade Malaysia and Burma, will they subsequently carry out improvements to the Burma Road. The simple answer is yes of course, it is to Britains advantage to do so, as it will serve to ameliorate the constant pressure from the Americans. And the improvements will come in stages, one of the first will be the addition of a 6 inch pipe alongside the road, as was done in 1945 once the road was reopened. Then there will be improvements to the surface, and a reduction in the overall length, as various sections of the route are redirected and shortened. While the British will be sending very little to China, they will be more than happy to transport all the American supplies that the Americans can spare. As for the British not caring much about the conflict in China, this isn’t totally true. The British are more than happy with the Japanese being distracted by the conflict in China, which serves to draw resources away from the conflict in Burma and Malaya.
RR.
RR.
Hi Foxy. Your story is amazing. loving the detail you're including.
If the British hold some or all of Malaya and that means all of Burma and if the Dutch offer stronger resistance, that's the war isn't it?
If the Japanese fail to gain sources of oil, their war machine grinds to a halt in 1942.
Game over.
If the British hold some or all of Malaya and that means all of Burma and if the Dutch offer stronger resistance, that's the war isn't it?
If the Japanese fail to gain sources of oil, their war machine grinds to a halt in 1942.
Game over.
Fatboy Coxy
Monthly Donor
Hi Kelgar, yes I would think the British would improve the Burma road where they can. A supply rout of Rangoon port, the railway north and then the Burma road, over a period of several months, could deliver a substantial amount of military supplies and equipment. It does open up the opportunity, as has been mentioned by others in following posts, of an expanded US air force operating out of China. How much the Japanese might divert resources from the Malaya/Dutch East Indies to supporting a push across Thailand, west to capture Rangoon is an interesting question.
Ramp-Rat
Monthly Donor
Ihagambia, while you are correct in that the conflict between Japan and the allied nations, has become much more difficult, the war as such is not over. Not even the war in the Far East and Pacific, the Japanese will be able to continue their conflict in China, which requires little oil in comparison to the war elsewhere. And the Allied forces will still have a hard time in trying to regain areas that they have lost, such as FIC, the Philippines and Pacific islands. In addition there is still the major conflict in the European region, as the collapse of the Japanese will have minimal effect on this region of a considerable time. While the Anglo Americans will be able to devote more resources to Europe, unless they follow a completely different strategy, it’s going to take time to build up the resources for an amphibious assault against France. And there is the problem of just how you end the conflict against Japan, given that they are not going to surrender. And any invasion of the Japanese mainland is going to be incredibly costly, in men and resources.
RR.
Fatboy Coxy
Monthly Donor
Hi Ihagambia, thank you for your words.
The holding of Malaya and stronger resistance in the Dutch East Indies, will, in my opinion, make a significant change to the progress of the war. The US will have a lot less time building up their forces, having to commit more of what they currently have into what will become an attritional campaign fought on land, sea and air. This has some advantages for Japan, fighting closer to their own supplies than the disastrous campaign at Guadalcanal. I don't see it as simple as "Game over" as you suggest, this campaign could be lost by the Allies with very heavy losses.
I think how much gets diverted depends on how much territory they have taken as well as how far behind schedule the IJA is, the more they get forced behind the more they will draw down from any Burma effort. It becomes a matter of honour and ego which are big factors in a lot of ways especially if you throw in IJN victories over the head.
A few things to remember here:
- The Burma Road in 1941 was a single-track unsurfaced route through some very rough country, which routinely became an impassable swamp in the monsoon.
- The railways in Burma don't connect to India, Malaya or Thailand, so everything is going through the port at Rangoon.
- The port of Rangoon was neither large nor modern.
There's a lot of logistical bottlenecks on the way to supplying China via Burma, especially if the British are also having to support any sort of significant campaign in Burma/Thailand - which is highly likely, if Britain is at war with Japan and the Japanese spot supply convoys heading to China along the Burma Road. Now if the Americans decide to get involved in a major way and throw all their engineering resources at the problem things may change by 1944, but in the short term you're just not going to be able to rush a huge volume of supplies to the KMT, even if the Burma Road stays open.
OTL the bulk of supplies over the Hump went to USAAF units in China, which grew from a single fighter group in 1942 to a 4-wing air force (14th Air Force) by mid-1944.
Once the British hold Burma the US is then able to surge Engineer units in to build the Burma Road. There was even studies to make a narrow gauge RR besides the pipeline to China to help with the supply situation. The Rangoon port is poor at this time but hold the border and the US comes in and rebuilds it to help bring the supplies to China. Look at what they did with the ALCAN highway when the war started.
A lot depends on the Japanese response if they get stuck in Malaya. Burma may be ignored, or it might be seen as an easier target than Malaya.
First priority for the Allies would be holding Burma, ahead of the Burma road.
MWI 41100609 The Perak Flotilla
Fatboy Coxy
Monthly Donor
1941, Monday 06 October;
At 60 tons and 76 feet long, they were bigger than a true 72-foot Harbor Defence Motor Launch (HDML), a number of which were currently being built at the same Thornycroft (Singapore) ship building yard that had built them, faster at 16 knots, as well as being a bit less cramped, they were ideal for patrolling the numerous rivers along the Malayan coast, owing to their three-screw layout. Operated by a crew of ten, 2 officers, 2 petty officers and 6 ratings, equipped with a venerable 3 pounder up front, and a single Vickers ‘K’ machinegun mounted in a tub attached to each side of the open bridge house. Better armament was planned, but they weren’t a high priority for that.
Built over several years in the late 1930’s, they had been intended to be used as training ships for the SSRNVR (Straits Settlement Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve), and then later the newly forming Malay section of the Royal Navy, before both of these were merged into the MRNVR (Malayan Royal Navy Volunteer Reserve) earlier in 1941. There were six in total, nominally given hull numbers 1101-1106, they were also given names, HMS Panji, Pahlawan, Panglima, Penyengat, Pengail and Penghambat respectively.
Pretty much everyone who had served in the MRNVR had served in one of them at some time or other, but now with the large increase in the force, newly trained recruits were being sent straight to the numerous auxiliary ships in commission as well. These six launches, together with an ex-Straits Steamship, Kudat, as mother ship, now formed the 34th ML Flotilla, but better known as the Perak Flotilla. HMS Kudat had been taken into service after modifications, including gaining an armament of a single 3-inch gun and a 2-pounder PomPom, with twin Lewis machine guns on each side of the bridge. Lt Cmdr Herbert Victor Creer, RAN, the twin brother of CO of HMS Moth, was the Flotilla commander, him being an Australian, had helped immensely when working with the Australian Commandos.
When Lord Gort had asked Admiral Layton if he could provide the necessary naval support to the forming of an amphibious commando company, Layton had agreed, but owing to the priority of other theatres over the Far East, suitable vessels were as yet to arrive, and so, as a stop gap measure, Layton had lent the Perak Flotilla. They had based at Teluk Anson, where both the Australian Independent Companies were accommodated, ideal country for both jungle and riverine training. Fortunately for Layton, their Lordships at the Admiralty had agreed to his suggestions for a more suitable naval force for this purpose, and both a ship and landing craft were on their way, arrival due late next month, allowing his Perak Flotilla to resume their normal patrolling duties thereafter.
At 60 tons and 76 feet long, they were bigger than a true 72-foot Harbor Defence Motor Launch (HDML), a number of which were currently being built at the same Thornycroft (Singapore) ship building yard that had built them, faster at 16 knots, as well as being a bit less cramped, they were ideal for patrolling the numerous rivers along the Malayan coast, owing to their three-screw layout. Operated by a crew of ten, 2 officers, 2 petty officers and 6 ratings, equipped with a venerable 3 pounder up front, and a single Vickers ‘K’ machinegun mounted in a tub attached to each side of the open bridge house. Better armament was planned, but they weren’t a high priority for that.
Built over several years in the late 1930’s, they had been intended to be used as training ships for the SSRNVR (Straits Settlement Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve), and then later the newly forming Malay section of the Royal Navy, before both of these were merged into the MRNVR (Malayan Royal Navy Volunteer Reserve) earlier in 1941. There were six in total, nominally given hull numbers 1101-1106, they were also given names, HMS Panji, Pahlawan, Panglima, Penyengat, Pengail and Penghambat respectively.
Pretty much everyone who had served in the MRNVR had served in one of them at some time or other, but now with the large increase in the force, newly trained recruits were being sent straight to the numerous auxiliary ships in commission as well. These six launches, together with an ex-Straits Steamship, Kudat, as mother ship, now formed the 34th ML Flotilla, but better known as the Perak Flotilla. HMS Kudat had been taken into service after modifications, including gaining an armament of a single 3-inch gun and a 2-pounder PomPom, with twin Lewis machine guns on each side of the bridge. Lt Cmdr Herbert Victor Creer, RAN, the twin brother of CO of HMS Moth, was the Flotilla commander, him being an Australian, had helped immensely when working with the Australian Commandos.
When Lord Gort had asked Admiral Layton if he could provide the necessary naval support to the forming of an amphibious commando company, Layton had agreed, but owing to the priority of other theatres over the Far East, suitable vessels were as yet to arrive, and so, as a stop gap measure, Layton had lent the Perak Flotilla. They had based at Teluk Anson, where both the Australian Independent Companies were accommodated, ideal country for both jungle and riverine training. Fortunately for Layton, their Lordships at the Admiralty had agreed to his suggestions for a more suitable naval force for this purpose, and both a ship and landing craft were on their way, arrival due late next month, allowing his Perak Flotilla to resume their normal patrolling duties thereafter.
IOTL, Yamashita shunted a division originally earmarked for the Malayan campaign to Burma after the ease with which his forces advanced down the peninsula. ITTL, the divisions earmarked for Burma might wind up diverted to Malaya instead after Yamashita's advance stalls. Any advance into Burma might very well be abandoned.
Japan had an estimated two year stockpile of oil when the US imposed its embargo in August 1941.
That means Japan must find new sources of oil or its entire military machine grinds to a halt in mid 1943.
Anything that prevents their access to alternate sources of oil is catastrophic.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/arch...d-pearl/1238a2e3-6055-4d73-817d-baf67d3a9db8/
That means Japan must find new sources of oil or its entire military machine grinds to a halt in mid 1943.
Anything that prevents their access to alternate sources of oil is catastrophic.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/arch...d-pearl/1238a2e3-6055-4d73-817d-baf67d3a9db8/
Better book on Pearl Harbor, Attack on Pearl Harbor by Alan Zimm. That article is mostly hokum that wasn't right even when it was written.