WWII Most Effective German Commander

[hasdrubal barca]

WWII Most Effective German Commander


Hi everyone perhaps you could help me out,
Recently I read an interview in Military History Magazine with World War II historian Rick Atkinson and in it he said that Hasso Von Manteuffel was probably Germany’s most effective commander, during the war. I personal think Walter Model was the most effective, but I have heard other people say Erich von Manstein and Heinz Guderian. What do you think? If there’s anyone I’m missing tell me in comments.


Thanks


Hasso von Manteuffel- Siege of Bastogne , Tunisia Campaign ,Battle of Clervaux
Walter Model - Operation Mars
Heinz Guderian- Battle of Sedan
Erich von Manstein - Third Battle of Kharkov
Felix Steiner - Battle of Narva
Erwin Rommel - Battle of Gazala
Albert Kesselring- Battle of Monte Cassino
Nikolaus von Falkenhorst - Operation Weserübung


Others
Gerd von Rundstedt
Hermann Hoth
Graf Strachwitz
Paul Ludwig Ewald von Kleist
Kurt Student
Josef Dietrich
Joachim Peiper
Günther von Kluge
Paul Hausser
Gotthard Heinrici

 

[Julian]

Model was easily the most successful and effective German commander.

 

[seraphim74]

How exactly can siege of Bastogne be an example of von Manteuffel's effectivness? IIRC he did NOT capture the town.

 

[BlairWitch749]

Model at all levels of line command from division to army group; full stop

 

[hasdrubal barca]

How exactly can siege of Bastogne be an example of von Manteuffel's effectivness? IIRC he did NOT capture the town.

You make a vaild point, but i'm not sure what battle to put up instead. Any other one you can think of for him that could replace it?

 

[BlairWitch749]

You make a vaild point, but i'm not sure what battle to put up instead. Any other one you can think of for him that could replace it?

his defensive command in africa (although doomed) was handled very competently

 

[Shapur2]

@ Blair witch

I'd put Operation Wacht Am Rhein (opening phase); unlike Dietrich's 6th SS in the north, Manteuffel made excellent use of infiltration tactics to undermine the American defences, a quick but devastating artillery barrage to stun the enemy and sever his communications, followed by a lightning advance that brought his spearheads all the way to Celles on the Meuse; though there were roadblocks that slowed him down (Clervaux, St. Vith, Bastogne), he achieved far greater success than his colleagues to the north and south, and dealt the Americans a substantial blow.

 

[hasdrubal barca]

Manstein would be my second choice, but i like Model's command style much better, agressive and upfront.

 

[Julian]

Manstein was a far more flawed commander than is often noted. He consistently failed to grasp Soviet operational and strategic intentions at key points in the campaign. This is especially true in July-August and November 1943.

 

[BlairWitch749]

I'd put Operation Wacht Am Rhein (opening phase); unlike Dietrich's 6th SS in the north, Manteuffel made excellent use of infiltration tactics to undermine the American defences, a quick but devastating artillery barrage to stun the enemy and sever his communications, followed by a lightning advance that brought his spearheads all the way to Celles on the Meuse; though there were roadblocks that slowed him down (Clervaux, St. Vith, Bastogne), he achieved far greater success than his colleagues to the north and south, and dealt the Americans a substantial blow.

Dietrich faced MUCH better organized and stiffer opposition; Mantueffel punched air for the most part

 

[BlairWitch749]

Manstein was a far more flawed commander than is often noted. He consistently failed to grasp Soviet operational and strategic intentions at key points in the campaign. This is especially true in July-August and November 1943.

July and August 43; 100 percent, Manstein suffered his greatest defeat in Operation Rumianstev as Zhukov duped him into a disaster of epic proportions

The November battles are a little harder to pin on him; not because the Russians didn't do well; but because Hitler and Hube created absolute command chaos in Manstein's operational area to the point were his strongest formations were given conflicting orders at the heights of critical battles

That would be lack bashing Model for Wacht on Rhein going poorly; he wanted no part of it and Hitler veiled threatened him to go through with it

 

[hasdrubal barca]

Is Rommel winning because he is the most well known or something else

 

[hasdrubal barca]

Manstein was a far more flawed commander than is often noted. He consistently failed to grasp Soviet operational and strategic intentions at key points in the campaign. This is especially true in July-August and November 1943.

He also complains a lot

 

[Julian]

The November battles are a little harder to pin on him; not because the Russians didn't do well; but because Hitler and Hube created absolute command chaos in Manstein's operational area to the point were his strongest formations were given conflicting orders at the heights of critical battles

That would be lack bashing Model for Wacht on Rhein going poorly; he wanted no part of it and Hitler veiled threatened him to go through with it

I feel that the strategic disaster in November 1943 was mainly Manstein's fault. Hitler did contribute to the problem, but only after the disaster had already begun. Manstein ignored his own advice and directed his attention towards AGS's right flank, almost completely ignoring Kiev. The counterstroke towards the Crimea was his brainchild, and diverted reserves from Kiev exactly when they were needed. He was unable to make a concrete decision on 6th Army's strength (And in turn whether to go ahead with the counterstroke) until it was too late, further complicating the situation. By then 4th Panzer Army had been shattered.

Mainstein was, as in July-August, duped by Soviet demonstrations and secondary thrusts into ignoring the critical axis around Kiev. This, along with more passive deception measures, allowed the Red Army to take the city and nearly destroy 4th Panzer Army.

Hitler's hand is more evident in the second stage of Kiev and the German counterattacks west of the city. But Manstein did fail to develop a clear operational goal, jumping between taking Fastov, Brusilov, Zhitomir, etc, then moving north towards Korosten. He also once again underestimated the Red Army's ability to reinforce the Kiev bridgehead, allowing 1st Guards, 1st Tank, and 18th Armies to deploy to the bridgehead undetected and shatter the front again in late December.

 

[AdA]

Model as the most effective in the peculiar circumstances of WW2 Germany. Manstein had arguably a larger share of genius, but genius requires a stronger safety net than effectiveness.

 

[dgharis]

My nod goes to Kesselring, whose contribution is much underrated. For almost two years he kept the Allied forces in Sicily and Italy at bay with minimal numbers of troops and his forces did not finally surrender until the Soviets were attacking Berlin. Anyone who wishes to learn defensive strategy and tactics would do well to study his conduct of that campaign.

 

[ivanotter]

I was also looking at either, Steiner, Kesselring or Manstein.

Manstein insofar as recovering after Stalingrad was a major thing.

Kesselring, obviously, becauseof Italy.

Steiner ranks right up there. I finally went with Steiner.

Richthofen could have been in there as well

Maybe Doenitz

 

[lionhead]

Define "most effective"

As it goes in outsmarting and defeating your enemies in the most effective ways Rommel is easily the top commander, on the offense. His defense was lacking though not useless, but still his offensives where the most effective of all commanders.

 

[AdA]

Define "most effective"

As it goes in outsmarting and defeating your enemies in the most effective ways Rommel is easily the top commander, on the offense. His defense was lacking though not useless, but still his offensives where the most effective of all commanders.

No, IMO. Rommel took risks that only paid of because of his opponents lack of ability to exploit them, and often allowed his battles to turn into confused melees relying on his staff to sort things out. He also tended to overwork his best troops, failing to develop his command into a coherent force were everybody pulled its weight. PzA Afrika resembled one of those companies were two employes (15th and 21st PzD) wear themselves out doing all the work while everybody else just cruises until it all goes bankrupt.

 

[hasdrubal barca]

I feel that the strategic disaster in November 1943 was mainly Manstein's fault. Hitler did contribute to the problem, but only after the disaster had already begun. Manstein ignored his own advice and directed his attention towards AGS's right flank, almost completely ignoring Kiev. The counterstroke towards the Crimea was his brainchild, and diverted reserves from Kiev exactly when they were needed. He was unable to make a concrete decision on 6th Army's strength (And in turn whether to go ahead with the counterstroke) until it was too late, further complicating the situation. By then 4th Panzer Army had been shattered.

Mainstein was, as in July-August, duped by Soviet demonstrations and secondary thrusts into ignoring the critical axis around Kiev. This, along with more passive deception measures, allowed the Red Army to take the city and nearly destroy 4th Panzer Army.

.

But, didn't Hitler damage the situation by ordering Manstein to hold the Donets Basin no matter what, which would entail shifting units to AGS's right flank?